Why India Trains Bangladeshi Officers at Indian Military Academy?

The training of Bangladeshi military officers at India's Indian Military Academy (IMA) represents a multifaceted dimension of Indo-Bangladeshi defence cooperation, rooted in shared history and evolving geopolitical realities. This practice, which has seen over 3,000 foreign cadets trained at IMA from more than 30 countries since its inception, including recent Bangladeshi participants, serves as a conduit for building interoperability, fostering trust, and advancing regional stability.

However, in the context of South Asia's complex security landscape marked by great-power competition, border tensions, and internal political shifts this initiative carries profound implications for India's strategic interests, Bangladesh's military modernization, and the broader equilibrium in the Bay of Bengal region.

Also Read: Bangladeshi Officer Lt. Safin Ashraf Graduates as Best Foreign Cadet from Indian Military Academy, Praises India as True Friend

Historical Foundations of Defence Ties

The genesis of India-Bangladesh defence relations can be traced to the 1971 Liberation War, during which Indian forces collaborated with the Mukti Bahini guerrilla fighters to secure Bangladesh's independence from Pakistan. This wartime alliance not only resulted in the surrender of 93,000 Pakistani troops but also established a foundation of gratitude and mutual reliance. In the war's aftermath, India played a crucial role in shaping Bangladesh's nascent armed forces, providing initial training and logistical support to the fledgling Bangladesh Army. The 1972 Indo-Bangladesh Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Peace formalized this bond, incorporating provisions for defence collaboration, non-aggression, and joint responses to external threats.

Despite early promise, the relationship experienced fluctuations. The assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975 ushered in military regimes that sought to distance Bangladesh from India, influenced by suspicions of Indian dominance and closer ties with Pakistan and China. Relations thawed in the 1990s and accelerated under Sheikh Hasina's leadership from 2009 onward, with Bangladesh cracking down on Indian insurgent groups operating from its territory, such as ULFA and NDFB. Key milestones included the resolution of long-standing land and maritime boundary disputes in 2015 and 2014, respectively, which paved the way for deeper military engagement.

Training programs emerged as a cornerstone of this cooperation. In the 1970s and 1980s, Indian personnel directly trained Bangladeshi forces, focusing on operational tactics and leadership. By the 2010s, structured initiatives like the annual "Sampriti" army exercises and "Bongosagar" naval drills emphasized counter-terrorism, disaster response, and maritime security. The integration of Bangladeshi cadets into IMA's pre-commissioning courses lasting 3 to 16 months represents an extension of this, with cadets undergoing rigorous physical, tactical, and leadership training alongside Indian counterparts. Notable examples include Mohammed Abir Hassan, the first Bangladeshi IMA graduate in December 2023, whose grandfather fought in the Mukti Bahini, and Lt. Safin Ashraf, who graduated as the best foreign cadet in December 2025, describing the experience as "prestigious and enriching."

Strategic Rationale for Training

India's decision to train Bangladeshi officers at IMA is driven by a combination of bilateral, regional, and global objectives. At the bilateral level, it enhances interoperability between the two militaries, crucial for addressing shared threats like cross-border terrorism, human trafficking, and natural disasters in the cyclone-prone Bay of Bengal. Bangladesh benefits from access to India's advanced training infrastructure, which bolsters its armed forces' professionalism and supports its prominent role in UN peacekeeping operations, where it ranks among the top contributors.

From India's perspective, this serves as a soft power instrument to cultivate long-term goodwill among Bangladeshi military elites. It also aligns with India's "Neighbourhood First" policy, aiming to integrate Bangladesh into its security architecture through frameworks like the 2017 MoU on defence cooperation and a $500 million line of credit for military procurement. Economically, it opens avenues for Indian defence exports, such as communication equipment and patrol vessels, under the "Make in India" initiative.

Regionally, the program helps counter China's influence, as Beijing supplies nearly 90% of Bangladesh's arms and has deepened ties through a 2002 defence agreement and submarine sales in 2013. By offering alternative training, India encourages diversification, reducing Dhaka's dependency on China amid concerns over the Belt and Road Initiative's implications for regional debt and security.

Geopolitical Significance and Broader Implications

The geopolitical weight of this training cannot be overstated in a region where alliances are fluid and great-power rivalries intensify. For India, it reinforces its role as a security provider in South Asia, particularly for its northeastern states, which rely on Bangladesh for connectivity and counter-insurgency support. It also addresses shared vulnerabilities, such as the porous 4,096 km border prone to smuggling, migration, and militant activities. In the Bay of Bengal, joint patrols and exercises mitigate threats like piracy and arms trafficking, while enhancing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) capabilities.

Yet, the program matters equally for its potential risks. Bangladesh's political transition in 2024, following Sheikh Hasina's ouster, has amplified anti-India rhetoric and incidents of border violence, raising questions about the wisdom of training officers who might serve under a less friendly regime. Critics argue that India's opposition to Bangladesh's diversification of arms sources, including from China and now Pakistan, could prove self-defeating, pushing Dhaka toward alternative partners. Pakistan's entry into training Bangladeshi personnel from February 2025, involving Major General-level officers, is viewed as a strategic counter to India, potentially recalibrating regional dynamics and challenging New Delhi's influence.

Moreover, external factors complicate matters. China's deepening economic and military footprint in Bangladesh, including infrastructure projects, heightens India's concerns over encirclement. Bangladesh's participation in U.S.-led exercises has also sparked Indian apprehensions, though analysts suggest these are unfounded and could complement rather than undermine bilateral ties. Broader challenges include unresolved issues like the Teesta River water-sharing agreement, which fuel domestic resentments in Bangladesh and hinder trust-building.

In conclusion, while India's training of Bangladeshi officers at IMA embodies the enduring spirit of cooperation born from 1971, its relevance in 2025 hinges on navigating emerging challenges. Sustaining this initiative requires diplomatic agility, economic incentives, and confidence-building measures to ensure it contributes to mutual security rather than unintended vulnerabilities. As South Asia's geopolitical landscape evolves, this program could either solidify alliances or highlight the perils of misaligned strategies.