Pakistan Air Force Faces Modernisation Crunch as Old F-16s, Mirages Age Out
Pakistan’s air force is heading into a costly transition as older fighter aircraft near the end of their usable lives and the price of replacing them keeps climbing. The Pakistan Air Force (PAF), which has long tried to preserve both numbers and capability in the face of its rivalry with India, now faces a tighter squeeze: several of its frontline squadrons will need to be replaced or renewed over the coming years, even as modern combat aviation becomes more expensive to buy, operate and sustain.
The issue is not unique to Pakistan. Since the end of the Cold War, air forces around the world have generally become smaller, even as individual aircraft have become far more capable. The Indian Air Force operates below its sanctioned strength of 42.5 fighter squadrons, while the US tactical fighter fleet has fallen sharply from its Cold War peak. European air forces also shrank after the collapse of the Soviet Union as governments benefited from the so-called “peace dividend”. China, by contrast, has expanded both the size and capability of its air force over the same period.
For Pakistan, the pressure is sharper because much of its combat fleet is old. The PAF operates a mix of American F-16s, French-origin Mirage III and Mirage V aircraft, and Chinese-origin platforms including the F-7, J-10 and JF-17. The JF-17 is assembled in Pakistan with Chinese cooperation, making it central to the country’s effort to modernise without relying entirely on expensive imports.
The Mirage fleet is the clearest example of the age problem. Pakistan began inducting Mirage aircraft in 1967. Although the fleet has been upgraded over time and supplemented by aircraft acquired from other countries, the basic airframes are now extremely old by modern fighter standards.
The PAF’s F-16 force faces a different but related challenge. Pakistan operates three F-16 squadrons, two of which were inducted in the 1980s and one around 2010. The aircraft remains a capable multirole fighter, but the age of the older Pakistani jets means service-life limits and sustainment costs are becoming increasingly important.
At the same time, the force is continuing to shift away from older Chinese-origin fighters. The PAF is in the process of converting its final F-7 squadron to the JF-17 Block III. Once that transition is complete, the number of JF-17-equipped squadrons is expected to rise from six to seven.
Pakistan has also added a higher-end Chinese fighter to its inventory through the induction of the J-10CE. According to the source material, the country has received the last of its 20 J-10 fighters.
Replacement needs are mounting
Even with newer aircraft entering service, the ageing fleet problem is far from solved. The assessment cited in the source material says six frontline fighter squadrons — two F-16 squadrons and four Mirage squadrons — will need replacement in the coming years. In a frontline force of roughly 15 fighter squadrons, that would amount to a large share of the PAF’s combat arm.
The force is larger when training and conversion formations are counted. The PAF also operates fighter units at the Combat Commanders’ School and operational conversion units flying F-16 and JF-17 aircraft. Including these formations, the number of PAF squadrons operating fighter aircraft is around 22.
But fighters alone are only part of the picture. Modern air operations depend on airborne early warning and control aircraft, electronic warfare systems and other enabling platforms. These assets are essential for getting the best out of advanced fighters, and they add another layer to the cost of modernising air power.
Pakistan has historically tried to keep a degree of numerical parity with India, which makes the replacement challenge more complicated than a simple procurement exercise. Islamabad must find a way to preserve fleet strength while introducing aircraft and systems that are far more capable — and far more expensive — than the aircraft they replace.
Possible paths forward
One option would be to buy more second-hand F-16s as NATO countries reduce their legacy fleets and move towards the F-35. Air Commodore GM Tripathi (Retd), VSM, former member of the National Security Council Secretariat, has suggested that this could allow Pakistan to maintain or even expand its F-16 fleet.
That approach, however, would not be straightforward. Pakistan’s air force has become increasingly reliant on Chinese systems, which raises questions about compatibility and integration between Western-origin F-16s and Chinese-origin combat platforms.
A more ambitious route would be to acquire a next-generation fighter. Pakistan has reportedly been seeking China’s J-35 fifth-generation fighter, although no formal deal was announced in the source material. Speculation intensified after Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif posted, and later deleted, a list of military equipment Pakistan was expected to procure from China.
If a J-35 deal were to happen, it would give Pakistan a major technological boost. But the platform would also come with high costs beyond the aircraft itself, including weapons, training, infrastructure, maintenance and support.
If the J-35 does not materialise, Pakistan could look elsewhere. Another possibility mentioned in the source is deeper cooperation with Turkey on the KAAN fighter, though that aircraft programme is still under development and would likely involve a longer timeline.
Air Commodore Tripathi has also suggested that Pakistan could consider stealthy unmanned combat aerial vehicles, while also acquiring more J-10CE fighters to strengthen its beyond-visual-range combat capability.
Any future move towards the Turkish KAAN would also have to account for Pakistan’s increasingly China-centric combat network. That kind of integration could require substantial cooperation between Turkey, Pakistan and China.
The money question
In the end, financing may be the hardest constraint of all. Pakistan has shown it is willing to spend heavily on military hardware. According to the source material, it was the world’s fifth-largest recipient of major arms during 2021–25, up from 10th place in 2016–20. Arms imports rose by 66 per cent between those two periods.
China has become central to that procurement pattern. Around 80 per cent of Pakistan’s arms imports during 2021–25 came from China, compared with 73 per cent in 2016–20. That dependence gives Pakistan access to a growing range of aircraft and other military technologies, but it also means the country’s future air-power structure is likely to be shaped increasingly by Chinese systems.
The broader question is whether Pakistan’s economy can support the cost of maintaining and modernising one of the world’s larger air forces. The source notes that Pakistan has the world’s 40th-largest economy according to the IMF, while maintaining what is ranked as the world’s seventh-largest air force. That is a substantial defence burden for a country with limited economic resources.
The comparison with Bangladesh is telling: Bangladesh has a stronger economy but operates a much smaller air force, highlighting how much priority Pakistan has historically given to combat aviation.
That leaves Islamabad with a difficult trade-off. Keeping older aircraft in service helps preserve numbers, but it increases maintenance headaches and pushes fleets closer to technical life limits. Replacing them with advanced fighters improves capability, but it dramatically raises procurement and life-cycle costs.
Modern air warfare also demands more than fighters. Airborne early warning aircraft, electronic warfare platforms, data links, sensors, precision weapons, tankers, unmanned systems and resilient command-and-control networks increasingly determine how effectively combat aircraft can be used. A smaller fleet with sophisticated sensors and networked weapons can outperform a larger fleet of ageing jets — but building that ecosystem requires sustained spending.
Pakistan’s recent procurement pattern suggests it is trying to balance those pressures by combining indigenous JF-17 production with Chinese imports while continuing to operate older American and French-origin aircraft. The JF-17 is especially important because it gives Pakistan a domestically assembled fighter option while keeping close technological ties with China. The transition from the F-7 to the JF-17 Block III is part of the effort to replace older aircraft without depending entirely on costly foreign purchases.
But the Mirage and older F-16 fleets cannot remain in service indefinitely. As more aircraft approach their technical total life limits, Pakistan will eventually have to choose between life extension, retirement and major replacement programmes. Those decisions will shape the PAF’s force structure for years to come.
A large purchase of advanced fighters could help preserve numerical strength, but it would put heavy pressure on national finances. A smaller acquisition programme might be easier to afford, but it could result in a smaller air force.
That is the central trade-off Pakistan now faces: quantity versus quality, at a time when both are becoming more expensive. The outcome will also matter for the wider India-Pakistan military balance. India’s fighter fleet has its own modernisation challenges, but New Delhi is also expanding indigenous aerospace production and diversifying its defence suppliers. Pakistan, by contrast, is becoming more dependent on China for new combat aviation capabilities.
For now, the PAF remains a substantial air arm with F-16s, JF-17s, J-10CEs and other aircraft in service. But the retirement challenge facing its Mirage fleet and older F-16s could force a major restructuring. The next phase of Pakistan’s air-power modernisation will depend on ageing aircraft, new technologies, strategic dependence and economic capacity — and on whether Islamabad can afford to keep a large fleet flying while moving to a newer generation of systems.